During Russia’s economic transition, the amount of fertilizer (as well as other tradable inputs such as fuel) used in agricultural production has fallen substantially. Mineral fertilizer use in 2000 was 86% lower than in 1990, while since the mid 1990s Russia has exported more than 80% of its fertilizer output. This paper examines the allocative efficiency of Russian use of mineral fertilizer to produce grain, assessed from the point of view of both domestic and trade prices. We use the results to examine whether fertilizer is being used at its optimal level, and whether the major changes in the volumes of fertilizer use and trade during transition have been economically rational. Implications for agricultural policy in Russia are then discussed.

**Methods and Data**

The method used to assess the allocative efficiency of Russian fertilizer use in producing grain is to compare the fertilizer’s marginal factor cost (\(MFC_f\)) with the value of its marginal product in grain production (\(VMP_{fg}\)). Given that Russian farms appear to be price takers in their purchase of fertilizer, we initially assume that fertilizer’s MFC to farms equals its purchase price (\(P_f\)). Russian grain producers will be using fertilizer efficiently (and at the profit-maximizing level) when

\[
P_f = MP_{fg} \times P_g\]

where \(MP_{fg}\) is the fertilizer’s marginal product in grain production, and \(P_g\) the price at which the producers sell their grain, with their product being \(VMP_{fg}\). If \(P_f > (\leq) VMP_{fg}\), we will refer to the situation as one of disequilibrium, in which the use of fertilizer in grain production should decrease (increase) in order to improve allocative efficiency.

We investigate Russian fertilizer/grain use in two specific years—1990 (representing the immediate prereform period) and 2000. The test for efficiency will be done using both domestic and trade prices. The domestic prices are estimates of what Russian farms paid for fertilizer and received for grain, and will indicate whether Russian farms were optimizing given the actual prices they faced. The trade prices used will be the prices at which Russian fertilizer and grain traded (or would have traded if exported) on the world market, and will indicate whether the “Russian economy” was optimizing when measured against opportunity cost.

The source for Russian domestic fertilizer prices is *Tseni v Rossii* (Russian Federation State Committee for Statistics (a)). The fertilizer trade prices are Russian export unit values for fertilizer in U.S. dollars from *Tamozhennaia Statistika* (Russian Federation State Customs Committee, 1994–2001). Because Russia’s trade data value both imports and exports in U.S. dollars, an exchange rate is not needed to determine dollar values. In computing the aggregate annual trade prices for fertilizer as well as the aggregate domestic prices, we weight each of the three main types of fertilizer (nitrogen, potash, and phosphate) by their shares in the total tonnage of fertilizer used in Russian grain production.

During the transition period, Russian fertilizer export prices have fluctuated considerably, largely following changes in world energy
prices. For example, in 2000 Russia’s unit value for fertilizer exports was relatively low at $74 per ton, compared to the average annual unit value for the country’s fertilizer exports during 1994–2002 of $95 per ton. Trade prices specific to any given year can be misleading as representative of a longer period of time. Therefore, in our allocative efficiency tests for both 1990 and 2000, we have the fertilizer trade price equal the average annual export unit values of fertilizer during 1994–2002 (Russia began releasing official foreign trade data in 1994).

The source for Russian domestic grain prices is also Tseni v Rossii. For trade prices, measurement is more complicated. Russia’s grain trade prices have also fluctuated during the transition period (following the world market). In the allocative efficiency tests, we therefore base the grain trade prices on prices covering the period 1990–2002. However, in only a few years (1997, 2001, and 2002) did Russia export enough grain such that its export prices (from Tamozhennaia Statistika) could adequately represent the prices at which Russia could have exported large quantities of grain. For other years, we base the Russian grain trade price on U.S. wheat export fob prices (Economic Research Service), since Russian grain exports are mainly wheat. In 1997, 2001, and 2002 Russian wheat export unit values were 40% below U.S. wheat export prices, probably due to quality differences and the product mix. Thus, we discount the U.S. wheat export prices by 40% to obtain our estimates of Russian wheat export prices.

For farm-level analysis, the relevant grain trade price is that part of the export fob price that farms receive. A major problem in Russian agriculture is that, because of incompletely developed physical and institutional infrastructure (including systems of market information and commercial law), the internal movement of agricultural commodities involves high transport and transaction costs (Wehrheim et al.). Ukrainian agriculture has similar problems, and Striewe finds that in the late 1990s grain-producing farms received prices equal to only about 45% of the grain’s export fob price (indicating a discount of 55%), compared to the 75% of the export fob price obtained by German grain producers. (Postharvest losses are taken into account in determining the real prices received.) U.S. wheat farmers receive prices equal to about 80% of wheat’s export fob price (ERS). In light of the evidence for Ukraine, Germany, and the United States, we discount the Russian grain export fob price by a further 40% to obtain the farm-level trade price.

To obtain estimates of \( MP_f \), we use several econometric studies of Russian agricultural production functions that have estimated output elasticities with respect to fertilizer. Multiplying these elasticities by the average product of fertilizer yields the estimated MP values. Table 1 presents the output/fertilizer elasticities computed by these studies. The first four studies are more relevant for determining MP values for our allocative efficiency test for 1990, while the last two studies are more relevant for 2000. Koopman has the drawback for our purposes of covering Soviet, as opposed to only, Russian agriculture, while Lerman et al. cover all the Soviet “northern republics” (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan). Lerman et al., Koopman, and Sotnikov also have the liability that they cover livestock output in addition to crops. Therefore, the output/fertilizer elasticities implied by the latter studies are underestimates for our purposes.

For use for 1990, the fertilizer elasticities of Lerman et al. and Koopman could be biased upward. After years of high growth in fertilizer application during the Soviet period, fertilizer use in 1990 was substantially higher than

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**Table 1. Studies That Estimate Russian Agricultural Production Functions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Output/Fertilizer Elasticity</th>
<th>Scope of Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lerman et al.</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>Soviet agricultural output over 1965–1990a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koopman</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>Soviet agricultural output over 1965–85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotnikov</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>Russian agricultural output over 1990–95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedik, Trueblood, and Arnade</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>Russian crop output over 1991–95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osborne and Trueblood</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>Russian crop output over 1993–98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASIS project</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>Russian crop output in 3 regions in 2001b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aCovers the “northern republics” of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan.

bThe regions are Rostov, Ivanovo, and Nizhni Novgorod.
average annual use for the period employed in estimating the production functions. This means the MP of fertilizer was probably lower relative to previous years. On the other hand, for use for 1990, the fertilizer elasticities of Sotnikov and Sedik, Trueblood, and Arnade could be biased downward. Russia’s price liberalization that began in 1992 quickly worsened agricultural producers’ terms of trade, such that fertilizer use began to fall heavily.

For 1990 we use a MP value derived from Sedik, Trueblood, and Arnade, and for 2000 a MP value from the work by Osborne and Trueblood. We choose these two studies because they both were done at USDA’s Economic Research Service (with Trueblood being a coauthor of both), and therefore have the benefit of being methodologically consistent. The two studies have the additional advantages of being confined to Russian crop output, and the output/fertilizer elasticities of the two studies are consistent. In 2000, Russia used 20 kilograms of fertilizer per hectare of grain area, compared to 81 kilograms in 1990 (Russian Federation State Committee for Statistics (b), p. 405). Thus, one would expect the output/fertilizer elasticity to fall, as it does in the two studies by two-thirds. From Sedik, Trueblood, and Arnade, we get an MP value of 1.5 tons of grain per ton of fertilizer used, and from Osborne and Trueblood we get a value of 1.85.

Calculations based on the results of Sedik, Trueblood, and Arnade and Osborne and Trueblood likely give lower bound values for fertilizer’s MP. Because this might bias the test results in the direction of apparent domestic overuse of fertilizer, we also use in table 2 a set of higher values for fertilizer’s MP and VMP, based on the results of the other studies cited. For 1990 we use a value for MP of 3.5, based on the output/fertilizer elasticities from Lerman et al. and Koopman. For 2000 we base the MP value on the elasticity from the BASIS project, which results in an MP value of 4.

### Results

The results from table 2 for 2000 show that whether the high or low MP value is used, fertilizer’s VMP greatly exceeds its domestic price. The results suggest that an additional ton of fertilizer to produce grain would increase farms’ revenue two to four times the fertilizer’s cost. Farms are using fertilizer at far below the profit-maximizing volume.

What could explain the apparent large disequilibrium? We consider the following possible explanations: (a) misallocation of resources by farm managers; (b) farms are in fact at (or much closer to) the profit-maximizing equilibrium, but we have either overestimated the MP of fertilizer or underestimated its cost to farms; (c) farms lack the working capital, to be financed by either their own revenue or credit, to buy fertilizer at market prices; and (d) farms are willing to pay higher prices to obtain more

### Table 2. The Allocative Efficiency of Using Fertilizer to Produce Russian Grain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fertilizer Price</th>
<th>MP of Fertilizer in $</th>
<th>Grain Price in $</th>
<th>VMP in $</th>
<th>VMP – Fertilizer Price in $</th>
<th>(VMP – Fertilizer Price)/Fertilizer Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000 (low MP)</td>
<td>Domestic prices</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1,865</td>
<td>3,450</td>
<td>1.853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade prices</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 (high MP)</td>
<td>Domestic prices</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1,865</td>
<td>7,460</td>
<td>5,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade prices</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (low MP)</td>
<td>Domestic prices</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade prices</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (high MP)</td>
<td>Domestic prices</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade prices</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tseni v Rossii and authors’ calculations.

Note: Prices for both fertilizer and grain are per ton, and the MP of fertilizer gives tons of grain produced per ton of fertilizer. Domestic prices are in roubles, trade prices in U.S. dollars.

*a* $P$ means price; MP marginal product; and VMP value of marginal product.
fertilizer, but suppliers impose quantity constraints on sales.

Managerial misallocation could, in principle, result as easily as in over- and under-use of fertilizer. In his classic study of U.S. agriculture, Griliches took his estimated excess of fertilizer VMP over factor price as evidence of disequilibrium in the form of fertilizer underuse. What made this explanation highly plausible in the U.S. context is the rapid growth in fertilizer use that occurred during 1950–1980. Fertilizer use in Russian agriculture also rose substantially during the postwar period, with total use of mineral fertilizer growing from 3.3 million metric tons (mmt) in 1970 to 9.9 mmt in 1990 (Russian Federation State Committee for Statistics (b), p. 405). During the transition period, however, Russian fertilizer use has plummeted, to only 1.4 mmt (mineral fertilizer) in 2000. Table 2 indicates that in 1990 Russian fertilizer was even more underutilized from the point of view of domestic prices than in 2000, with the returns to farm profitability of using more fertilizer being from four to twelve times the fertilizer’s price. During the Soviet period, however, the state set prices for both agricultural inputs and outputs, and allocated inputs. Thus, table 2 cannot be used to demonstrate misallocation in the sense of market disequilibrium that could be corrected simply by the passage of time or by the introduction of more astute farm managers.

The studies on which we base our MP values might overstate the actual MP values. One reason is the classic “management bias” problem (see Mundlak). Farm managers most likely vary in their abilities, and the more efficient ones generate a higher MP and therefore use more fertilizer. Thus, a cross-sectional regression overstates the MP of fertilizer on an average farm—the estimated output elasticity measures the gain in output between poorly managed and better managed farms and attributes to fertilizer what properly accrues to management. However, the fact that we use as a lower bound the smallest of a range of quite different estimates of fertilizer MP reduces the chances that our lower bound is too high.

We might also be underestimating farms’ total cost of using fertilizer, which involves the cost of not only purchasing, but also applying, the fertilizer. Application costs would ideally be incorporated in the machinery and labor input variables used to estimate the production functions. All of the studies cited, however, use the Cobb-Douglas functional form, which assumes that all inputs are substitutes and thereby does not allow, for example, any machinery and labor to be input complements of fertilizer. Epstein (BASIS project) estimates that the application costs of fertilizer could equal 20% of the fertilizer’s price. However, the disequilibrium we estimate is so large that increasing the fertilizer marginal factor cost by 20% would not come close to reversing the finding of underuse of fertilizer.

Another cause of the disequilibrium could be financial constraints, such that farms lack the working capital, financed either from their own revenues or credit, to purchase inputs. A well-operating credit system does not yet exist for Russian agriculture, as the unprofitability of most Russian farms during the transition period has discouraged commercial lending to agriculture.

The last possible explanation for the disequilibrium—that farms are willing to pay higher prices for fertilizer, but suppliers are averse to selling at even greater prices—appears to be the most convincing. Evidence (Interfax) indicates that to obtain fertilizer, Russian farms usually need the help of a higher authority, such as their regional government, which either pays higher prices for the fertilizer or commands delivery at low prices. Regional governments often “sell” fertilizer to farms at attractively low prices, in return for the farms’ commitment to sell back their output, or at least sell within the region.

Table 2 shows that the large gap between fertilizer’s VMP (as conventionally computed) and price has fallen substantially during transition. The main reason is that the ratio of the price of grain to fertilizer (both in tons) has dropped significantly, from 3.7 in 1990 to 1.17 in 2000. This fall coincides with the steep decline in Russian agricultural producers’ overall terms of trade during transition. Does this suggest that further deterioration in grain producers’ terms of trade vis-à-vis fertilizer (and perhaps other inputs as well) that is inherent to the reform process might be in store for Russian farms, which would eliminate any apparent underuse of fertilizer from the point of view of allocative efficiency and farm profitability?

Analysis of the allocative efficiency of fertilizer use when assessed from the point of view of trade, rather than domestic, prices indicates that this could well be the case—that is, that fertilizer is not being underused from the national viewpoint when world prices are the benchmark. Table 2 shows that in 2000, when the
low estimate of fertilizer’s MP is used and both fertilizer and trade prices are measured at their export trade values, fertilizer’s trade price almost exactly equals its VMP. As such, fertilizer use is at its optimum. In 1990, fertilizer’s trade price exceeded the VMP (at the low MP value), indicating fertilizer “overuse.” When the high MP value is used for both 1990 and 2000, we again get the result that fertilizer is underused (price < VMP). For reasons discussed in the previous section, we believe that the lower MP values (based on Sedik, Trueblood, and Arnade and Osborne and Trueblood) are more likely to be correct. In short, relative to trade prices, fertilizer does not appear to have been underused during the transition period.

The conclusion that fertilizer was being overused at the start of the transition from the point of view of foreign trade is consistent with both the large drop in Russian fertilizer use during transition (both in general and for grain), and the fact that since the mid-1990s Russia has exported more than 80% of its fertilizer output. The conclusion that fertilizer use in grain production is currently at (or at least very close to) its optimum with respect to trade prices, even while a large disequilibrium appears to exist with respect to domestic prices, helps explain why Russian farms cannot obtain more fertilizer at existing domestic prices. Trade prices for fertilizer are so high relative to domestic prices that Russian fertilizer producers have much greater incentive to produce for export than for domestic sale. In 2000 the ratio of the trade prices (per ton) of fertilizer to grain (farmgate) was 1.86, while the ratio for domestic prices (grain at farmgate) was 0.86. Another export incentive for Russian fertilizer producers is that they can keep, and invest, their earnings abroad. These fertilizer export inducements explain why Russian farms need the help of nonmarket forces, such as their regional government, to obtain fertilizer supplies.

Russian domestic fertilizer markets therefore appear to reflect not only a disequilibrium between input prices and the inputs’ VMP, but also the fact that domestic prices differ so strongly from (relative) trade prices. Since transition began in the early 1990s, Russian farms’ domestic grain to fertilizer terms of trade have been steadily worsening, moving closer to the terms of trade given by world trade prices. Yet, the price data for 2000 show that this reform-driven price adjustment is not yet complete. Our results suggest that if the process were immediately completed such that world trade prices wholly determined domestic prices, Russian farms currently would not be underusing fertilizer.

What are the policy implications of our results? If Russia wishes to maximize the gains from trade and integration into world markets, the large disparity between domestic and world (relative) prices will continue generating domestic signals and incentives to use resources in a way that reduces these potential gains. A more specific improvement would be to make internal agricultural input markets more responsive to domestic demand, such that farms could bid more effectively for inputs by offering higher prices. Allocative efficiency, and the agricultural economy in general, would also benefit from a more effective farm credit system that could provide farms with working capital. Another way to strengthen allocative efficiency would be to improve the quality of farm management, especially with respect to economic decision making. Russian grain producers, and the agricultural economy in general, would also benefit if the high internal transport and transaction costs of moving grain were lowered.

Conclusion

The results show that when assessed with respect to domestic prices, Russia in both 1990 and 2000 underused mineral fertilizer in the production of grain, from the point of view of both allocative efficiency and farms’ profit maximization. Using the most credible values for marginal productivity from the available empirical evidence, we find that from the point of view of trade prices, Russia in 1990 was overusing fertilizer, and in 2000 was very close to its optimal level of fertilizer use. These results help explain why during transition Russian use of fertilizer has plummeted while the country has exported the bulk of its fertilizer output.

References

BASIS Project on Russian Agricultural Input Markets. Ongoing research project centered at Russian Institute for Economy in Transition, Moscow. Funded by U.S. Agency for International Development, and co-directed by Eugenia Serova and Bruce Gardner.

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