The Search for Parity

FARM PARITY, as a goal under which farmers and nonfarmers would enjoy equality of opportunity for income, usually is associated with the New Deal of the thirties. Actually, the search for income parity for agriculture has been going on a long time. The Virginia Colony attempted in 1621 to stabilize tobacco prices by limiting production and burning surpluses. The search began on a national scale with the close of the Civil War, when it became apparent that farm people would not long continue as a majority in the population and agriculture as a clearly dominant segment of the economy. America began its move from a rural society toward an urban one. The beginnings of the agricultural revolution made it possible for farm production to exceed demand, and farm income declined sharply. Rural discontent grew. Agitation for a living wage in agriculture began. The search fluctuated in intensity; farm prices rose and fell throughout the period from the Civil War to the First World War. Phases of the search included the Granger and Greenback movements, the Farmers' Alliance, and the Populist Party, whose supporters proposed the establishment of cooperative marketing groups, increased issues of currency, Government loans to farmers, control of rail shipping rates, and numerous social reforms.

The beginning of the First World War gave American agriculture an unprecedented stimulus. Spurred by high prices and patriotism, farmers set out to feed the world. They mechanized their farms and sold their horses. They diverted several million acres from growing feed for horses and mules to producing food and fiber. They plowed up 40 million acres of new land. They raised total production tremendously—but at high costs to themselves. To buy more land on which to grow more food and to buy machinery with which to operate it, thousands of farmers mortgaged their farms heavily at wartime values. The average mortgage debt per acre by 1920 was more than 2.5 times the 1910 debt. The demand for food continued at high levels for a short time after the Armistice. Farmers continued to produce an abundance as the extravagant postwar buying began to fade, as foreign nations rebuilt their agriculture and erected tariffs to protect themselves, and as the United States began to dam the flow of credit abroad. With incredible suddenness, it seemed to farmers, we lost our European markets. The production of food exceeded demand. Agricultural prices broke in



1935.

midsummer of 1920 and continued downward. The August index of prices received by farmers was 16 points under the June index, and the drop continued for the rest of the year at about the same monthly rate—a cumulative drop of 79 points during the second half of the year. In contrast, prices paid by farmers in 1920 were higher than those of any preceding year and higher than those of any succeeding year until 1947.

As prices declined, farmers increased their production even more in an attempt to maintain their income. They succeeded only in lowering farm prices further. Farmers produced surpluses to sell at whatever prices were offered. Industry could control its production and so was better able to maintain its price levels. Farmers were at a disadvantage. Farm income declined by more than half; with it went the farmers' purchasing power. Factories closed their doors. Workers went into breadlines. Our whole national economy was sick. By 1932 cotton had dropped to about 6 cents a pound, hogs to 4 cents a pound, wheat to 38 cents a bushel, and corn to 32 cents a bushel. Gross farm income dropped from nearly 18 billion dollars in 1919 to little more than 6 billion dollars in 1932. Net farm income also dropped—from 9 billion dollars in 1920 to 2.5 billion dollars in 1932. The total farm mortgage debt had increased 2 billion dollars since 1919. Foreclosures increased from 3.1 per 1 thousand farms in 1919 to 38.8 in 1933. Nearly 15 thousand banks closed their doors in 1920–1933.

These depressing conditions led farmers to band together and seek reforms. They joined farm organizations. They became increasingly able to exert political pressure. A Farm Bloc was organized in the Congress and succeeded in twice passing the McNary-Haugen Bill, which proposed that the Federal Government export surpluses to bolster domestic prices of farm products. President Coolidge vetoed it both times. Then, in 1929, the Agricultural Marketing Act became law. It set up a Federal Farm Board, whose operations were designed to stabilize farm prices. Its efforts were limited at first to loans to cooperatives, but the sudden drop in agricultural prices in 1929 caused it to organize stabilization corporations to purchase commodities and hold stocks off the market. Their efforts to support prices led to severe losses and little stabilization of prices, since the Board was attempting to cope with the world depression that was just beginning.

Farm parity, as a defined concept, probably had its beginnings during this period. George Peek, a leader during the McNary-Haugen fight, prepared a pamphlet, "Equality for Agriculture," in 1922. It defined a "fair exchange value" in terms of the relationship between agricultural prices and the general price index: Parity was achieved whenever the average price received by farmers and the wholesale price index of all commodities purchased by consumers had the same relationship as they did in a particular base period. The base period—the period in which these prices were in a fair and equitable relationship to one another—was generally agreed to be 1910–1914, the period just before the war. The thinking of Mr. Peek and other leaders was probably affected by Department of Agriculture Bulletin 999, "Prices of Farm Products in the United States," by George F. Warren. It appeared in 1921. Mr. Warren developed the first index of prices paid to farmers and compared farm prices with all wholesale prices in order to obtain a rough measure of the purchasing power of farm products.

It is not surprising that parity or "fair exchange value" was couched in terms of prices. Prices received were thought of as a measurement of purchasing power, and depressed farm prices were associated with depressed income for agriculture. Income, however, is affected by the number of units sold as well as the price per unit. Net farm income is affected by the cost of production as well as prices paid to farmers. Although parity of income is the goal of the search, parity as a measuring device is a price concept. Prices can be readily determined. The problem of determining the net income of farm families, of apportioning it among the several commodities or groups of farmers, and finally of selecting the volume of production to use in translating prices to income is difficult. Because of these difficulties and because no actual working formula has been developed so that parity income can be used as bases for

guiding day-to-day operations, the simpler parity price standard was used in administering farm programs developed in the thirties.

Obviously, the price concept of parity had, and has, weaknesses. Parity prices do not measure the cost of farm production plus a fair profit. Neither will they provide farmers with incomes equal to incomes of nonfarm people—although, when prices of farm commodities are at parity levels, farm incomes are generally in better balance with those of nonfarm people. A parity price is not one received by a farmer for a specific grade, quality, or class of commodity at a specific place. Instead, it is a general or overall standard representing a United States average price for all grades, qualities, and classes of the commodity sold by farmers as a group. It is the dollar-and-cents price used to measure the degree to which farm prices—but not income—are in line with what the Congress has defined as a fair goal or objective. No definition of parity prices is as succinct, however, as the statement of a farmer: "If you sell a bale of cotton and buy with the money as much food, clothing, machinery, and fertilizer as you could in the base period, cotton is selling at parity."

As America moved into the thirties, cotton prices fell far below parity level, and so did the prices of other agricultural commodities. There was no doubt in farmers' minds that the Nation was experiencing a crisis in agriculture. By 1932, "the farm problem" became a phrase in everyday conversation and one of national concern. The enormity of the declines in farm prices and incomes and the volume of farm foreclosures made clear the need for stabilization of

Farmers in the 1920's.

prices. The Federal Farm Board had demonstrated the futility of attempting to control prices through purchasing and withholding operations, when no effective authority to control production was provided. When Franklin D. Roosevelt became President in 1933, new farm legislation held a high priority on his list of actions to correct economic conditions. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 provided production controls on wheat, cotton, rice, tobacco, corn, hogs, and dairy products and authorized benefit payments to cooperating producers. Payments were financed out of taxes imposed on processors. The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) was created under the President's emergency powers and given wide authority to purchase, hold, deal in, sell any and all agricultural commodities, and to lend money on them. The first price-support operations started on a permissive basis in October 1933, when loans were made on corn at the rate of 45 cents a bushel and on cotton at 10 cents a pound. The prices of corn, cotton, tobacco, and naval stores were the only ones supported before 1938.

In 1936, however, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the production control features of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and ruled against processing taxes on the ground that they were an inseparable feature of the production control plan. Later in the year, the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act became law, but it was inadequate for production control. Heavy crops of wheat and cotton in 1937, accentuating the twin problems of surpluses and low prices, led to passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which originally provided for mandatory price-support loans on corn, wheat, and cotton; permissive supports for other agricultural commodities; and, when necessary, marketing quotas on tobacco, corn, wheat, cotton, and rice. These quotas were keyed to acreage allotments and were intended to keep supplies in line with market demand. The act was amended in succeeding years, and the list of commodities for which support was mandatory changed. In 1961, however, the act of 1938, as amended, was still in effect and provided authority for acreage allotments and marketing quotas. Under this act, and related legislation, CCC has supported more than 100 different permissive commodities, including fruit and vegetables for processing and various types of seeds.

To encourage heavy production of farm products required to meet war and postwar needs, the so-called Steagall Amendment in 1941 made supports mandatory on all 14 commodities for which the Secretary of Agriculture publicly asked for expansion of production. High mandatory support levels were continued for most supported commodities under the Agricultural Act of 1948, but discretionary support was permitted for most of the "Steagall commodities." The 1948 act was superseded by the Agricultural Act of 1949, which continued supports at 90 percent of parity for basic com-

modities, provided for eventual use of flexible levels, and wiped out the Steagall classification. Although foreign agriculture had recovered to a considerable extent, crop production in the United States was increasing steadily, and surpluses were beginning to accumulate. The 1949 act was amended many times, but in 1962 it still provided the basic authority to support prices.

The Korean War strengthened farm prices, and most of the stocks acquired from the 1948 and 1949 crops were sold. Stocks began to accumulate again in 1952 and 1953, under programs that maintained a 90-percent support level for basic commodities and with no controls except for tobacco and peanuts. Acreage allotments on the 1954 corn crop and marketing quotas on 1954 crops of wheat, peanuts, tobacco, and cotton were imposed. The Agricultural Act of 1954 provided flexible supports for 1955 basic crops, but stocks continued to increase. The Agricultural Act of 1956 provided for a Soil Bank Program to assist farmers to divert a part of their cropland from the production of excessive supplies. Support levels and support prices trended downward during 1955-1960, in line with the philosophy of the administration of establishing supports at lower levels to lessen production for Government storage. Controls were minimized to the extent possible under existing law, and dependence was placed on the Soil Bank for diverting excess acreage from production and on Government export programs for removal of existing surpluses. Under the Agricultural Act of 1958, acreage allotments for corn were discontinued, after they were rejected by producers in referendum in favor of lower supports and unlimited production.

Low farm income in relation to nonfarm income, excessive production, and excessive Government stocks were issues of the 1960 campaign. With the change in administration, management of supply and the use of more and better controls began to be emphasized. Support levels of many price-supported commodities were raised in the spring of 1961, and emergency feed grain legislation—limited to the 1961 crop—provided substantially higher support levels for farmers who voluntarily reduced acreage of corn and grain sorghums by 20 percent or more. To maintain income of participants, payments were authorized to compensate farmers who were carrying out approved conservation practices on retired land. In addition to the acreage limitations, quantities of corn and grain sorghums eligible for support were limited to producers' 1959-1960 per-acre yield, multiplied by the 1961 acreage. That summer, the Agricultural Act of 1961 became law. It continued the 1961 feed-grain program for the 1962 crop, added barley, provided a similar program for wheat, and cut the national allotment 10 percent.

During the period of change in farm legislation, the need for a new parity formula became apparent. Although the 1910-1914 per-

iod was a statistically sound base for calculations immediately after the First World War, it began to be outdated as changes in both the supply and demand sides of agriculture developed. The Agricultural Acts of 1948 and 1949 provided for use of a modernized parity formula based largely on the relationship of individual commodity prices during the most recent, moving 10-year period. In effect, the new formula permits adjustments that have gradually developed among prices of individual farm commodities to be reflected in the parity price of individual commodities. At the same time, it maintains the 1910–1914 overall relationship between prices received and prices paid by farmers. The effect of shifting from the old to the "new" parity formula was cushioned by stretching the change over a period of years. Although legislation changed, programs designed to bring about farm parity are not greatly different from those established during the thirties. Programs have survived a succession of conditions, including a world depression and surpluses, dust-filled skies and farm migrations, drought of unprecedented degree, increases in demand during the Second World War and the Korean action, and later a decline in farm incomes and the accumulation of new surpluses. Throughout the period, the basic objectives and the tools of the programs have remained much the same. Over the years, many changes in the designation of commodities eligible for price support have been made. By 1961, changes in conditions had enabled the Department to discontinue price-support programs for nearly 50 commodities, many of which were minor crops. Prices were still supported for 21 commodities, 16 of which the law required to be supported.

Programs to stabilize or increase farm income have been greatly expanded since 1933. Those designed to stabilize farm prices may be classified as price-support, price-strengthening, price- or program-protection, and direct-payment programs. Commodities are acquired under the price-support program, and this necessitates storage and disposition programs. Programs that move stored commodities into domestic and export channels, other programs important to farm income, such as the agricultural credit and area development programs, and various utilization, research, marketing, and extension programs are discussed elsewhere in this book. Here we discuss only the "price programs," the Agricultural Conservation Program, and crop insurance.

Prices are supported directly by loans, purchase agreements, and purchases. The National Wool Program utilizes direct payments, but this program varies from other price-support programs and is described as a direct-payment program. Loans support prices in two major ways: By providing farmers a cash return for the commodity at the support level and by propping up market prices of the commodities through withdrawal of supplies from the market. They

also help to bring about more orderly marketing by preventing market gluts at harvesttime. The loan method gives the farmer an opportunity to market his crop or keep it under loan, whichever is more advantageous. If the market price rises above the loan level, plus charges, he has the privilege of paying off the loan and selling his commodity in the open market. If the price fails to rise above the loan level, however, the farmer can deliver his commodity to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) instead of repaying the loan. The loan program tends to even out marketings. Farmers are inclined to market their crops at harvesttime to obtain cash or because they lack storage space. This sometimes makes for market gluts, undue burdening of the transportation system, and lower prices. Farmers who utilize the loan program, however, can hold their crops without risk for later marketing. This tends to spread marketing over the season and thereby reduces the extent of price swings. Private lending agencies, mostly local banks, make most of these loans. CCC agrees to take over the loans, if requested. Price-support loans have been available in recent years on all supported commodities except dairy products, tung nuts, wool, and mohair. Loans have been available on tung oil, however.

A purchase agreement is an agreement on the part of CCC to purchase from a producer, at the producer's option, not more than a stipulated quantity of a commodity at the support price. Loans and purchase agreements provide support at the same level. A loan suits the needs of the producer who requires money immediately and who can meet loan storage requirements. A purchase agreement provides a convenient, inexpensive form of price insurance for the producer who does not have an immediate need for cash, who is not able to meet loan storage requirements, or who is not willing to encumber his commodity, as is required under the loan operation. Purchases are made of butter, Cheddar cheese, and nonfat dry milk from manufacturers and handlers to support the prices of butterfat and manufacturing milk. Cottonseed prices are supported by direct purchases from ginners and also from producers whenever nonparticipation by ginners makes such purchases necessary. Flaxseed prices are also supported, in part, by direct purchases from producers. Milk producers, except as members of cooperatives, do not deal directly with the Government in connection with the support program for manufacturing milk and butterfat. Purchases of butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk by the Government maintain the overall price structure for dairy products, and the support level to milk producers is reflected in prices paid by milk handlers and manufacturers. In the case of cottonseed and flaxseed, producers deal with the Government.

Supply adjustment aspects of price-support programs are aimed at bringing supplies of agricultural commodities into line with

national needs. Tools used to accomplish this aim include acreage allotments, marketing quotas, and payments for diverting land to conservation uses. Acreage allotments may be combined with marketing quotas to serve the double purpose of determining the maximum acreage that a farmer may harvest and still obtain price support and, at the same time, determining the amount that each farmer may market without incurring penalties. Acreage allotments represent the maximum acreage a producer may harvest and be eligible for price support. A marketing quota, as specified by law, is the quantity of a commodity that is produced from an acreage allotment. In combination, allotments and quotas can limit production more effectively than the use of allotments alone can. Nevertheless, the legal definition of marketing quotas permits farmers to increase production per acre without penalty, and the size of minimum national marketing quotas—set by law for cotton, wheat, rice, and peanuts—can also reduce their effectiveness.

Conservation payments for diverted acres is the third method practiced to limit production. The Soil Conservation and Domestic

President Roosevelt presents a Government check to William E. Morris of Nueces County, Texas, a participant in a program to cut cotton acreage. Henry A. Wallace, at the far right, was the Secretary of Agriculture. Marvin Jones, at the far left, was Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture in 1933; he later became War Food Administrator.

Allotment Act of 1936 provided payments for shifting acreage of such soil-depleting crops as corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco, and rice to such soil-conserving crops as grasses and legumes and for carrying out soil-building practices. The Agricultural Act of 1956 established the Soil Bank. Under its Acreage Reserve Program, farmers agreed to cut their acreages below allotments. In return, they received payments to compensate for loss of income from the land diverted. Payments, based on normal yields, were made, and diverted land could not be cropped. Under the Conservation Reserve Program of the Soil Bank, producers could place any part or all of their entire farm under contract for periods of 3, 5, or 10 years. Under the 1961 feed-grain program, farmers who voluntarily reduced corn and grain sorghum acreage 20 to 40 percent (or more when bases were less than 100 acres) and placed these diverted acreages under a special conservation program received payments in negotiable certificates representing grain from CCC stocks. The majority of cooperating producers accepted payment in cash rather than grain.

The storage facilities program is necessary to maintain the quality of commodities acquired. Objectives of the program are to help producers finance storage facilities on their own farms—which permits farmers to participate fully in price-support operations and promotes generally more efficient marketing; to make maximum use of commercial facilities in the storage of Government-owned commodities; and to provide Government owned or operated facilities for storing acquired commodities (primarily grain) in areas where privately owned facilities are inadequate. Farmers' cribs or bins must meet the approval of the Government in order to be eligible for loans on farm-stored commodities. Commercial storage facilities are utilized under a uniform grain storage agreement, which establishes storage payment rates and requires the warehouseman to compensate the Government for any deterioration in quality of the commodities stored. In addition, the Government owns bins for the storage of grain and utilizes idle merchant ships of the reserve fleet for the storage of Government-owned wheat.

Price-strengthening programs utilize marketing orders and agreements but do not involve acquisitions of commodities by the Government. They seek to establish and maintain orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities moving in interstate and foreign commerce. A marketing order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is binding on all handlers of a commodity in the specified production area. Programs for milk are in effect under orders without agreements, whereas most programs for commodities other than milk are under both. Milk order programs provide for the classification of milk on the basis of use and for the establishment of minimum prices that must be paid producers.

For commodities other than milk, such as fruit, vegetables, and tree nuts, both marketing orders and agreements are in effect. Prices are not established, but the program seeks to enhance or maintain prices for affected commodities and regulate their flow to market. Several types of regulations may be used. These include controls over the grade, size, quality, maturity, quantity eligible for marketing, and diversion of excess production into new or non-normal uses. Also included are the establishment of reserve pools for the control and disposition of surpluses; the prohibition of unfair trade practices; posting of prices; regulations of containers; and the establishment of certain marketing, research, and development projects.

Since efforts to maintain agricultural prices cannot be wholly successful if competitive foreign imported articles are allowed to take the domestic market away from domestic producers, the regulation of imports is authorized under certain conditions. These activities commonly are referred to as Section 22 operations, since Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as amended, authorizes them. The law permits the President to impose restrictions in the form of import quotas or fees in addition to existing tariffs, after a hearing held by the Tariff Commission.

Two programs are in effect that involve direct payments to producers. The commodities affected are not produced domestically in sufficient supply to meet domestic needs. The National Wool Program is essentially a price-support program, but loans, purchases, and purchase agreements are not involved. A grower sells his shorn wool in normal marketing channels. At the end of the marketing year, he receives a payment that amounts to the difference between a previously announced incentive price and the United States average price received by producers for wool sold during the marketing year. The same program applies to producers of mohair, but market prices have been high enough in recent years to make payments unnecessary. The Sugar Program provides for payments to domestic producers of sugarbeets and sugarcane grown for sugar, provided they comply with certain labor, wage, price, marketing, and acreage requirements prescribed by law. The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized by the Sugar Act of 1948 to determine in December of each year the sugar requirements of consumers in the continental United States for the next year. Of this quantity, the act apportions quotas to domestic and foreign producing areas. The total outlay of the Government for operating the program is more than offset by collections under a special tax of 50 cents per hundredweight of sugar, raw value, imposed on all sugar processed in the United States and all sugar imported for direct consumption.

The Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) was established by the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act in early 1936 to assist farmers in making land use adjustments and in carrying

out soil and water conserving practices. Designed to meet both current and long-range production needs, the program is flexible. It provided a fertility reserve, which was drawn on to increase production during the war to meet defense needs. Today, it stresses the twofold value of conservation and production adjustment by encouraging sound land use adjustments away from intensive crop production. It utilizes a farmer-Government partnership, which recognizes both the farmer's responsibility for protecting and improving his land and the public's responsibility for bearing its fair share of the cost. With the assistance of ACP, the farmers establish grass, legume, and tree cover; improve existing vegetative cover; establish or improve timber stands; build small dams for water storage; construct sod waterways and terraces; level land to conserve irrigation water; apply lime to make possible the growth of conserving cover; and carry out other needed conservation measures. The program provides emergency assistance to farmland damaged by drought, hurricanes, and floods. Through cost sharing, farmers and ranchers invest their own money, time, machinery, and labor, amounting nationally to about half the cost of installing conservation measures. ACP assistance in the form of materials, services, and financial aid accounts for the other half.

Financial difficulties of farmers due to crop failures prompted several private companies to write insurance against crop losses. These ventures, all of short duration, revealed that guaranteeing crop production is a risky and complicated matter. There was increasing demand that Government provide such protection since it was not available from private sources. The Congress preferred that private sources meet the need, but insurance representatives held out little hope for it unless the Government obtained experience indicating that such insurance could be operated on a sound business basis. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation began operation of all-risk crop insurance in 1939 following passage of legislation in 1938. In 1948–1960, 94 cents of each dollar of premium was returned to policyholders through indemnity checks. The Corporation's Report to Congress in 1959 listed 118 causes of damage to crops, for which indemnities of nearly 450 million dollars have been paid. An all-risk policy covers damage beyond the farmer's control. It does not include losses due to negligence or poor farming practices. The policy provides protection from planting through harvest. Some crops are lost before they ever really start to grow, others are destroyed the day of harvest, and many are lost during the long period that lies between. Both production practices and insurance problems differ by crops, but knowledge and experience gained on each crop insured has resulted in gradual expansion of insurance to cover wheat, cotton, barley, oats, corn, flax, peaches, rice, tobacco, beans, grain sorghum, soybeans, and citrus fruit in about a thousand counties.

Farmers applied for price-support loans and Government aid offered during the troubled thirties.

Farmers in 1941 met to hear their county AAA representative explain details of a cotton program.

What are the results of the search for parity? Has it been achieved, or it is a goal yet to be reached? Prices of farm products today have greater stability than they did before we had price programs. We have a greater reserve of fertility and production potential than at any time in our history. Crop insurance has prevented economic distress during periods of crop failure. Net incomes of farmers are well above those earned when the programs were instituted. During the war and early postwar years, parity was achieved. Increased prosperity enabled farmers to substitute capital for land and labor. Increases in production per acre and per hour of labor were accomplished and resulted in more efficient production. Total production, however, increased at a much faster rate than demand, and agricultural prices began to slip in the last decade. Price programs slowed this decline, but could not affect rising industrial prices—the prices paid by farmers for the tools of production. The farmer was caught in a cost-price squeeze and, in 1960, netted only 80 percent of parity. On a per capita basis, farmers' incomes were a smaller percentage of nonfarm incomes than at any time since 1940. Lower incomes for farmers resulted from their inability to adjust production to demand and from a lack of purchasing power in underdeveloped countries that prevented America from fully sharing her abundance with the needy, except at heavy cost to taxpayers.

Farm programs are supporting farm income, but more consideration should be given to the causal factors of the farm problem. Programs should be of a type easily altered to permit rapid adjustments of supply to meet changing conditions and to prevent accumulation of stocks greatly in excess of needed reserves. In revising old programs and developing new ones, policymakers must seek to insure enough production of food and fiber to supply high living standards for all Americans and to assist our friends throughout the world to move toward these standards. To this end, more effective worldwide distribution must be sought. On the demand side, the utilization of agricultural products must be expanded with special concern for those in need at home and abroad. More emphasis should be placed on achieving parity of income rather than parity of price alone. Operators of efficient family farms should be assured the opportunity of achieving parity of income without losing control of their own enterprises and without exploiting either the taxpayer or the consumer. Farmers in marginal, depressed areas should be provided with either the assistance and guidance that will enable them to farm efficiently or the guidance, training, and employment assistance that will enable them to find economic opportunity outside farming. The search for parity is not ended. Parity has not been achieved, but neither is it lost. The search must go on. Our experience is a foundation for programs of the future. *(Murray Thompson)*